This working paper explores long-run patterns in the strategies of international business in developing countries. There was a massive wave of Western multinational investment in the developing world during the first wave of globalization before the 1920s. The subsequent decades of de-globalization saw the proportion of world FDI in developing countries sharply decline, and it has remained far below pre-1914 levels during the second global economy beginning in the 1980s. The working paper shows how management strategies were shaped by context in each historical period which provided a mixture of opportunity and risk. In the first wave of globalization, MNEs sought access to resources, and governments frequently gave them exclusive contracts and favorable deals in order to build businesses. The major management challenge was to overcome logistical challenges to enable minerals and other commodities to be exported into global value chains. During the Great Reversal, the main challenges faced by MNEs were political. Firms needed to build political contacts with assertive host governments, and attempt to strengthen their local identities, especially by localizing their managements. There was little need to adjust products to highly protected markets, or respond to limited local competition. In the contemporary global economy, political risks partially declined with the spread of liberalization and the abandonment of anti-foreign restrictions. However corporate strategies needed to carefully manage relations with governments. Emerging markets, or at least the larger and more fast-growing ones in Asia and Latin America, were increasingly seen as indispensable by MNEs in every industry. They were both a place to assemble manufactured goods and locate activities in the lower end of global value chains, and a fast-growing market.
that they were of little interest as markets, except for basic clothing. Famously, exports of British and other Western textiles flooded into India and other countries, helping to decimate their traditional textile industries. Dunning and Lundan, MNEs, p. 175; World Investment Report (1992) and (1995); World Investment Report (2008) , pp.10, 257-60. n.a. not available
The Great Reversal was triggered by the Great Depression, and in particular the policy response in the form of exchange controls and tariff barriers. There was a dramatic fall in international trade, and the growth of multinational investment virtually ceased. The spread of nationalistic, anti-foreign governments, sharply raised political risks during the 1930s, further prompting firms to form cartels rather than risk investing in foreign countries, or employ other non-equity forms. The growth of tariffs in interwar Latin America, for example, led US MNEs to subcontract production of their brands to local manufacturers. World War 11 devastated Europe and much of Asia, and eventually led to the expropriation of German and Japanese FDI.
As is evident from Table 1, the Great Reversal saw a sharp fall in the relative importance of emerging markets in world FDI. This was driven in part by wide-ranging expropriation combined with divestment as a response to political risk. The Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917 had resulted in the expropriation of a large amount of Western FDI, as Russia had been one of the world's largest host economies. The spread of Communism to China and Eastern Europe after World War 11 shut off further large parts of the globe to capitalism. The dismantling of Western colonial empires, the spread of government restrictions on foreign firms in most of postcolonial Asia and Africa, further decimated Western multinational investment in developing countries. There was a widespread expropriation of foreign ownership of natural resources during the 1970s, although it is important to note that in important industries such as oil, this was effectively a shift in mode of entry from ownership in the form of concessions to contracts. In 1929 India, China and many other emerging markets where still among the top twenty hosts for FDI. (Wilkins, 1994) By 1980 levels of FDI in those countries was zero, or close to zero. Overall only just over one-fifth of world FDI stock was located in developing countries, and around a third of inward FDI flows. By that date, the integration of worldwide capital, commodity and labor markets as a whole remained much less than sixty years previously.
There is no consensus when the contemporary era of globalization began. A good case could be made for dating it to the 1960s, especially because of the appearance and growth of global financial markets, which eventually undermined governmental restrictions on capital movements. However, insofar as political factors had driven de-globalization, it is more appropriate to take China's adoption of market-oriented policies in 1978 as chronological starting point for the new global economy. The subsequent growth of the Chinese economy set off a chain of pressures and events which encouraged developing countries, especially India to 1991, to follow suit. The advent to power of the right-wing, free-market governments in Britain and the United States respectively, in 1979 and 1980 , and the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, fueled the momentum which drove down barriers to global capitalism and foreign investment. During the 1990s globalization was given a further massive push by the advent of the World Wide Web and the digital age. Table 1 shows the subsequent growth of FDI stock and flows, which assumed an unprecedented importance of foreign direct investment in the world economy in 2007, the year before the global financial crisis which has led to nearly a decade of stagnation or even decline in investment levels.
The new political environment transformed the opportunities for Western MNEs in emerging markets, at least until the new century. Restrictions on foreign ownership, pressures to make joint ventures with local firms, trade barriers and exchange controls, melted away or were greatly reduced. Deregulation and privatization opened up sectors such as telecommunications which had long been closed to foreign companies. Indeed, practically every government on the planet offered incentives for MNEs to invest in them. It was striking, however, that although FDI in developing countries increased rapidly, it showed no signs of recovering to the relative importance it had once held in the first global economy. (See Table 1 ) A major reason was that FDI stock and flows were so concentrated geographically. In 1990 Asia accounted for two-thirds of all FDI inflows into the developing world. In 2007 China and Hong Kong alone accounted for nearly one-third of total FDI inflows into the developing world, and Brazil accounted for a further 7 per cent. In contrast, India, Russia, and most of Africa and Latin America received limited investment, despite large-scale liberalization of regulation. The nature of political risk assumed new, and often more subtle, forms. There was no reversion to the era when Western firms, supported by their home governments, could dictate their terms to developing countries.
International law was clear that property could only be taken for a public purpose, and that compensation had to prompt and adequate, but countries sometimes ignored the law, and there were many arguments about what constituted prompt and adequate compensation. Nor was the protection of intellectual property effectively secured by international law.
The extent of Western multinational investment in emerging markets, then, has varied considerably over the last hundred and fifty years. The following sections look at multinational strategies and management in the three distinct eras in the history of the global economy.
IB Strategies in the First Global Economy
IB strategies are in part fully explicable by existing theories. Western firms had ownership advantages in organization and technology. Emerging markets had locational advantages in natural resources and cheap labor. Transactions cost theory explains patterns of vertical integration in minerals and agricultural products. Problems of quality control from situations of information asymmetry, for example, encouraged vertical integration in tropical fruits such as bananas. However many emerging markets had characteristics which were distinctive from developed countries, whose setting was the basis for the development of the theory of multinational enterprise, and this shaped distinctive managerial strategies. Among these distinctive characteristics was a legacy of constrained autonomy and colonialism, institutional voids or at least frailty, and long bouts of turbulence. (Austin, Davila and Jones, 2017) . Management strategies were shaped by context in each historical period which provided a mixture of opportunity and risk. Four broad environmental factors determined the trade-off between opportunity and risk. The first was the prevailing political economy, including the policies of both host and home governments, and the international legal framework. The second was the market and resources of the host emerging market. The third factor was the state of transport and communications infrastructure within countries, and connecting them to the rest of the global world. The fourth factor was competition from local firms. The impact of these factors on multinational strategies is shown in Table 2 during the three eras of globalization. Western banks, trading companies, shipping companies, plantation and mining ventures not only interacted regularly in host economies, they were also quite frequently linked through equity, non-equity and other links into the same business group. (Jones, 2000) .
MNEs rarely had to adjust or innovate in their strategies in response to competition from locally-owned firms, as there was limited competition. India. The Sassoon's were able to rapidly gain market share from the British trading companies selling opium to China. They integrated vertically by becoming bankers to the opium crop dealers in India, enabling them to control production, and they took control of the local opium auctions in India along with other Baghdad Jewish families. Dent's went bankrupt in 1867, but Jardine Matheson responded to lower cost local competition in a fashion which later other Western MNEs would follow. It withdrew from opium trading, itself under an increasingly cloud of legitimacy as its dangerous medical consequences were realized, and shifted into higher valueadded and more respectable activities, including shipping, ports and railroad building, in which it held stronger advantages in management and access to finance. (Jones, 2000; Connell, 2004) The major strategic challenges faced by Western MNEs, then, lay more in execution in the face of the poor transport and communications infrastructure. Finding oil when exploration techniques were primitive; transporting oil from where it was found to where it could be shipped to consumers; building bridges and railroads in inhospitable and physically dangerous terrains;
turning malaria-infested tropical lands into banana plantations, were all massive technological, financial and organizational tasks. They were, however, essential because investment strategies were heavily focused on supplying commodities and foodstuffs -whether minerals, petroleum, bananas, tea or beef -to global value chains. Most minerals and agricultural commodities were exported with only the minimum of processing. This meant that most value was added to products after they left producer countries.
The MNEs which succeeded in this era, then, needed the technological, and especially the organizational, capabilities required to overcome major logistical challenges. In the case of Pearson in Mexico, for example, the firm transferred best-practice engineering capabilities to its construction projects, proceeding where others failed. In contrast, the firm's oil exploration efforts failed miserably until high quality geologists were hired from the United States. (Jones and Bud-Frierman, 2016) However organization mattered more than technology. The Singer Sewing Machine Company, a rare case of a manufacturing company which sold products to emerging markets, expanded globally from the 1860s until it held a 90 per cent share of world sewing machine sales by 1914, including in India and other emerging markets. The firm's technology was broadly comparable to other firms, and its success lay in a series of organizational innovations including enabling potential consumers to buy the product using hire purchase, and establishing a direct sales force which enabled it to sell machines, and collect payments. A striking feature of this firm was that these organizational innovations originated in host economies as the firm expanded globally, being subsequently transferred throughout the organization. (Carstensen, 1984) This firm depended more on its organizational capabilities than insider advantages, and more developed markets remained the most important part of its
business.
An important managerial capability was to adapt to the quite different legal, market and cultural contexts of emerging markets without losing original capabilities. The overall strategy of successful British overseas banks in Asia and elsewhere, for example, showed little innovation.
They focused on trade finance and foreign exchange, and as in Britain, short-term lending was the norm, and equity stakes in industrial or agricultural ventures were never taken voluntarily.
The execution of this strategy, however, was more radical. While in Britain, banks would always lend on the basis of security, usually property, in many developing countries this was not an option, sometimes, as in Iran, because of legal restrictions on the foreign ownership of property.
British banks ended up, as a result, lending against share certificates, commodities, and even a person's reputation. They also engaged in extensive lending and borrowing with indigenous bankers, whether compradors in China, shroffs in Sri Lanka, or sarrafs in Iran. (Jones, 1993) The MNEs which succeeded most in developing countries in the first global economy, then, combined contact capabilities with colonial regimes and other Western business networks with organizational capabilities, especially the ability to respond flexibly but effectively to often more unpredictable and challenging operating conditions than in their home countries. The logistical challenges of doing business in the emerging markets were by far the greatest managerial challenge.
IB Strategies in Emerging Markets during the Great Reversal
The previous strategies of Western MNEs contributed significantly to the growth of restrictive, anti-foreign policies which now excluded them from many emerging markets. The close links between companies, colonial regimes and oppressive dictators served to undermine the legitimacy of global capitalism in the eyes of many people. There seemed to be few benefits to countries and their peoples of foreign MNEs, and huge downsides. Many of natural resource investments in the first wave of globalization had been highly enclavist. Foreign firms had been large employers of labor. US mining and smelting properties in Mexico alone are estimated to have employed more than 500,000 in 1915, but here and elsewhere expatriates held all the skilled and managerial posts. (Headrick, 1988; Wilkins, 1970) The localization of staff is significant in explaining the scale and scope of Unilever's business in developing countries during these decades, which was strikingly large compared to its major US competitor Procter & Gamble, which only had operations in a handful of emerging markets, including Mexico, Peru, Philippines and Venezuela, before the 1970s, primarily because of fears about political risks and hyper-inflation. (Dyer et al 2004) It provides an important part of the explanation how Unilever was able to retain control over large businesses in countries such as India and Turkey where FDI as a whole dropped to low levels as a result of government exchange and price controls, as well as demands for majority equity participation in local subsidiaries. The early localization of senior management was critical in providing voice, contacts and legitimacy in such countries, embedding the firm in local business and political systems. Unilever identified, and promoted to the most senior positions, some of the best business leaders of their generation in these and other developing countries. This meant not only that Unilever's businesses were managed by good people, but also that it was able to function as a quasi-insider within governmental and business networks in countries. (Jones, 2013) In Unilever's case, there were other considerations also. It was already selling and manufacturing in India in the interwar years, and entered Turkey in 1950. As Import Substitution Industrialization regimes were adopted, Unilever was well-situated inside protected domestic markets, even though it had to contend with price and capacity controls, dividend limitations and other government regulations. Unilever was able to transfer brands, technologies and marketing methods from its businesses in developing markets, and exploit them behind tariff walls.
Unilever's decentralized management structure permitted flexibility in adjusting to the different environments in these countries. In countries such as India and Turkey, the company made margarine from sunflower oil and toilet soap from palm oil. It invested in tomato puree, jasmine plantations and chemicals. It exported shoes to met government-imposed export quotas. It engaged in rural development in India, and built its own power plants to run factories. This flexibility helped the local managers of the company, especially during the fraught 1970s, to engage in prolonged negotiations to delay government plans for local subsidiaries to become locally-owned. In both countries, as a result, Unilever was able to retain majority control until the early 1980s, when pressures for localization abated. (Jones, 2013) Unilever's strategy in developing countries rested on patience regarding rates of return.
Unilever took a long-term view that sooner or later as incomes rose, people in every country would want to consume the company's products. It accepted low dividend remittances for years, or decades, from both India and Turkish businesses, as well as many countries in Africa, both to build up businesses, and to wait for better times. It made large investments in plant and equipment -often at the expense of short-term remittances for dividends to its shareholders -in order to build sustainable businesses. Only a firm of its size and financial strength, as well as willingness to put managerial imperatives ahead of shareholder interests, could take such decisions. (Jones, 2013) Learning to negotiate with the governments of emerging markets was the key to corporate success in this era. The case of the Brazilian automobile industry illustrates its importance. During the 1950s the government of President Juscelino Kubitschek implemented strategies to encourage foreign firms to build an automobile assembly industry in his country.
The strategy involved both foreign exchange and tax subsidies, alongside the progressive closure of the market to imported finished vehicles. Despite multiple pleas from the government, Ford, which assembled vehicles from kits and had dominated the market, refused to invest in automobile assembly, as did its major US rival, General Motors. Instead Germany's Volkswagen, which had no production beyond its home country before 1956, successfully entered vehicle production. By the mid-1960s, Volkswagen had captured over 40 per cent of the expanding Brazilian market, while former market leader Ford had been reduced to 6 per cent, and General Motors to 7 per cent. (Shapiro, 1994) MNEs in the resource sector had less scope to negotiate with governments. From the late 1960s governments in most developing markets moved to take over foreign ownership of the natural resources in their countries. Often this was done by outright nationalization, which left companies little to negotiate about except, if they were fortunate, compensation terms. In more pro-Western countries, such as Malaysia, state-owned companies were used as vehicles to buy the foreign companies which owned the country's vast rubber and oil palm plantations, with domicile then being transferred back to Malaysia and the management localized. (Jones, 2000) Whilst local ownership over natural resources became a matter of principle for many governments, control was another matter. In the case of plantations, Western companies often negotiated long-term purchasing and technical contracts with local producers, leaving them with the most valuable parts of the commodity value chain -transport and distribution -whilst relieving them of the embarrassment of employing and managing tens of thousands of impoverished plantation workers. (Jones, 2005b) The limited scope for negotiation was especially evident in the petroleum sector. The quickly developed managerial and technological competences. (Bamberg, 2000; Sluyterman, 2007) In the first era of globalization, Western MNEs had paid limited attention to the consumer markets of developing countries, as they were too poor to buy anything but basic items. After World War 11, this strategy began to slowly change, but there were major issues of what to sell, and how to sell it. In consumer products, firms initially transferred products from developed countries to developing markets as their incomes rose. There was little product innovation as such, therefore, although sometimes brand images were changed, and sometimes consumers themselves found new uses for products. Because little attempt was made before the 1980s to reformulate shampoos for none-white ethnicities, for example, Vaseline petroleum jelly, created in mid-nineteenth century America and used as soothing skin cream, became widely used in postwar Africa as a hair product. (Jones, 2005b) The direct transfer of Western consumer products to developing countries was sometimes highly problematic. The adverse consequences of the marketing of baby food by Nestlé became a cause célèbre, as it emerged that mothers regularly mixed the formula with polluted water, or else effectively starved their babies as they could not pay for a sufficient amount of the product. (Bader, 1980) As deleterious was the spread of cigarette consumption. From the early twentieth century Western tobacco companies had played an inglorious role in using their marketing and distribution capabilities to grow cigarette consumption in Asian and other developing countries.
During the second half of the century, as health concerns and consequent regulation mounted in developed countries, cigarette MNEs expanded their businesses in developing countries. (Shepherd, 1989; Yach and Bettvher, 2000) In many other cases, the attempt to transfer Western consumer products to developing country markets was just commercially unsuccessful. During the 1960s, for example, Unilever tried to sell its margarine in Thailand, only to discover that in countries which ate rice rather than bread, the market was strictly limited. Similarly, Unilever's early attempts to sell ice cream in countries where electricity supplies were unreliable were not successful. Nor were attempts to sell branded convenience foods to countries where the urban middle class ate out cheaply on street stalls or in restaurants, while the rest of the population was too poor to buy branded products. It proved somewhat easier to sell some beverages to developing countries. Nestlé's Nescafe instant coffee, invented in 1938, proved to be remarkably global food product. (Jones, 2005b) There was also innovations in how to market consumer products to emerging markets in the era of the Great Reversal. In the beauty industry, for example, Western MNEs made markets and created consumer desires in Latin America. Marketing strategies were skillfully adjusted to local conditions. In interwar Brazil women seldom read newspapers, the traditional medium used elsewhere by toiletries and cosmetics companies for advertising. So Unilever switched to the more popular medium of radios. Latin American women were enticed with the opportunity to including Venezuela, where it controlled half of the cosmetics market.
Avon was enormously skilled at marketing cosmetics. When it entered a new market, it began with acquainting representatives and customers with the Avon line. It provided representatives with the desirable products at good prices, so providing them with an attractive earning opportunity. It tailored its strategy to local circumstances. It invested heavily in cosmetics education in countries such as Venezuela, which at the time used few cosmetics. In
Brazil Avon responded to prevailing gender norms which disapproved of women working outside the home by a campaign to portray direct selling as a respectable activity akin to marriage. It also created a new accounting system in response to escalating inflation rates during the 1960s. In the 1970s a handful of Western firms began to invest in product innovation designed to deliver products especially for emerging markets. Unilever's large Indian affiliate, Hindustan Lever, which had created its own research facilities in the 1950s, was among the pioneers. It began selling its own distinctly Indian shampoo and toothpaste brands, as well as brands from Unilever's global portfolio. More interesting, was the creation of Fair & Lovely skin-lightening cream in 1978. This was cream designed to appeal to a traditional regard for fairer skin in India.
The origins of such preferences lay deep in Indian history, which some traced back to the origins of the caste system two and a half thousand years ago, when fair-skinned foreigners established a class system with the indigenous darker-skinned local population at the bottom. Much later, the era of British rule introduced a new set of rulers with lighter skins. Hindustan Lever now applied its scientific and branding capabilities to translate such cultural preferences into a highly successful brand, which became the best-selling skin care brand in India. Fair & Lovely was based on a patented formulation containing an active ingredient which controlled the dispersion of melanin in the skin. The brand's advertising promised greater fairness within six weeks of using the product, and from the beginning the brand emphasized the improved marriage prospects of fair-skinned women. Considerable use was made of endorsement by celebrities from the huge Indian cinema industry known as Bollywood, whose leading actors and actresses were overwhelmingly fair-skinned. (Jones, 2010) In most countries, if Western MNEs stayed, or were allowed to stay, they faced limited competition from local firms. Indeed, the government policies of this era were often as destructive of local capitalist enterprise as they were of foreign investment. In 1952 Bolivia, for example, became the first country to take over its tin industry. Although the Patiño group remained important in the marketing and smelting of tin, it was fragmented because of the loss of ownership of the mines. The same phenomenon was seen in Africa. Egypt had a highly developed private sector in an African context. Yet, by the 1960s, its large-scale private sector had been entirely dismantled by government policies. Nigeria's business communities, which had once appeared as dynamic forces, lost energy as they became deeply engaged in the ethnic and regional rivalry that became a feature of the country.
As governments imposed extensive regulatory regimes, local entrepreneurs in developing markets grew their businesses more by using "contacts" rather than building technological and organizational capabilities. This did not necessarily prevent the creation of large firms, although it usually provided a weak foundation for competitiveness against Western firms, apart from their close connections to their government.
India provided one case where local firms were able to slowly build organizational capabilities, despite the inefficiency and corruption of the country's quasi-socialist planning system. Indeed, the era laid the basis for India's subsequent success in information technology.
During the 1960s and 1970s a handful of locally-owned firms were established to develop and run applications software for Indian companies and research institutions that had brought or leased mainframes from IBM and other US companies. Tata, which was India's largest business group, established the first of these firms, Tata Consulting Services in 1968. In 1977 when the Indian government tightened the laws on foreign ownership of firms in the country, IBM and other US firms divested, opening new opportunities for the Tata venture, and for subsequent start-ups such as Infosys. The Indian firms built a strong trade association, NASSCOM, which sought to enhance and certify the quality of Indian firms. By the time policy regulation got underway in 1991, which gave Indian IT firms a freer hand in establishing marketing offices abroad and serving foreign clients, it had built strong organizational capabilities (Parthasarathy and Aoyama, 2006) .
One early challenger to MNEs came in detergents, where Nirma Industries challenged the long-established hold on the Indian market by Unilever by introducing a game-changing lowpriced detergent. The Indian fabrics market until then had been dominated by hard soap, and Unilever's expensive, premium powder brand Surf was decimated after 1975 when Nirma launched a powder at parity with hard soaps, but with much better washing powder, providing a new value for money concept. Having begun with such low price products, Nirma moved upmarket with products which directly competed with Unilever's customer base and took market share from them. It was only after a significant delay that Hindustan Lever was able to respond with low cost but quality product, although it turned out that this traumatic episode exercised a long-term impact on Unilever's strategy in developing markets. (Jones, 2005b) The MNEs which succeeded best in developing markets in this environment tended to have decentralized management systems which were capable of turbulent economic and financial environments, dealing with high levels of intervention by governments, and the disruption of global value chains.
IB Strategies in Emerging Markets in the Second Global Economy
The era of the second global economy enabled MNEs to pursue new strategies. In particular, the lowering of barriers to foreign companies in many emerging markets, combined with transport innovation such as container shipping and by digital communication, enabled
Western firms to exploit the low cost labor of developing countries. The transfer of assembly facilities to low wage locations in developing countries, which were frequently free trade and low tax zones, had been pioneered by the semiconductor industry as long ago as the 1960s.
South-east Asia and Mexico were initially the major locations. By 2000 1.3 million Mexicans were employed in foreign multinational owned factories that assembled imported components for export, mostly located just over the border with the United States. These maquiladoras accounted for over 40 per cent of total Mexican exports. (Jones, 2005a) By then the outsourcing of multinational production to China had become a major trend, making that country essential to global value chains. Apple provided a prominent example.
Apple began outsourcing to the Taiwanese On the other hand, there were also other processes at work also. The globalization of the ubiquitous hamburger helped stimulate, around the world, a local, cultural, ethnic, religious reaction, which was termed "tribalization" by the political theorist Benjamin Barber. (Barber, 1995) As global markets spread, existing consumer and social groupings began to fragment as local cultures asserted themselves with greater confidence.
To revert to the example of the beauty industry, the result was a new set of marketing opportunities and challenges for MNEs. The opportunities in emerging markets were enormous.
In the 1980s the United States, Western Europe and Japan were the dominant markets for the industry. China's consumption of beauty products other than toiletries was close to zero. By This so-called "frugal engineering" posed a major threat to the higher-cost structures of MNEs from developed countries. (Kumar, 2008 ) Only a few MNEs were able to develop production and marketing strategies which kept their costs down, and were capable of selling to the world's poorest at the "bottom on the pyramid". (Prahalad, 2005) These included Unilever, which after experiencing the onslaught by Nirma pioneered strategies such as selling consumer products in small sachets which the very poor could buy.
In some cases local firms based in large and fast-growing emerging markets became As local firms in emerging markets gained competitiveness, MNEs with strong proprietary technologies and well-regarded brands were best-placed to compete with local firms which were expert in frugal engineering. MNEs with global design and product capabilities were also able to retain advantages competitive against local rivals, especially if their marketing and other strategies were able to combine their global capabilities with local relevance. Both Western and Japanese MNEs were also able to build advantages in emerging markets, including China, by emphasizing that their products were of the highest quality and safe to both consumers and the environment.
Conclusions
In the first era of globalization, the strategies of MNEs in the developing world had been straightforward. They had sought access to their resources, and governments had frequently given them exclusive contracts and favorable deals in order to build businesses. Innovation had rested more in overcoming logistical challenges to enable minerals and other commodities to be exported into global value chains.
During the Great Reversal, the main challenges faced by MNEs were political. Mounting hostility led many firms to divest, and to invest elsewhere. Politics, exchange controls and trade restrictions curbed the role of emerging markets in global value chains. The MNEs that remained needed to build political contacts with local governments, and attempt to strengthen their local identities, especially by localizing their managements. There was relatively little attempt to adjust products to highly protected markets. There was also relatively little need to adjust to local competition.
In the contemporary global economy, political risks declined with the spread of liberalization and the abandonment of anti-foreign restrictions. There was no sudden reversion to the pre-1929 situation, however, and in major emerging markets, corporate strategies needed to carefully manage relations with the government. China was in an special category in this regard by virtue of the country's size, its accelerating development and technological level, and the special position of the ruling Communist Party. Emerging markets, or at least the larger and more fast-growing ones in Asia and Latin America, were increasingly seen as indispensable by MNEs in every industry. They were both a place to assemble manufactured goods and locate activities in the lower end of global value chains, and a growing market. However there was a growing need in some at least emerging markets to incorporate local relevance into global products.
